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Jur. § 159, p. 782; Whitley v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.2d 75,
78 [113 P.2d 449]), ameudecl the section as it presently reads.
[5] Accordingly, the time limitation appears to be not a
normal statute of limitations, but rather to be more in the
nature of a qualifying condition in the exercise of any right
to death benefits. Diligence in the presentation of the claim.
s:l as not to be guilty of sleeping on one's rights, apparently has no bc·aring if the specified time provisos are not
satisfied. [6] Petitioner elaims that the applicatirJn of the
statute so as to cnt off any right to death benefits before it
accrues would be unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without clue process of law. (U.S. Const., Fourteenth
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) However, her right to
recoyer death benE'fits is wholly statutory, and her constitutional objection has no bearing on the issue.
[7] It thus appears that the Legislature in plain language
has declared the governing time limitations, as it has the right
to do. There is no ambiguity in the present wording of the
section, and it neither requires nor admits of interpretation.
(Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2d 344, 353-354
[139 P.2d 908].) Accordingly, in this case where the bar
of the prescribed limitation period was raised, the commission properly denied relief under the provisions of section
5406 of the Labor Code.
The order of the Industrial Accident Commission is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Sheuk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor,
J ., and Schauer, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 23806.
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ANTHONY ROGEHS, Respondent, v. LOS ANGELES
TRANSIT LINES et al., Appellants.
[1] Carriers--Pa;:;sengei's-Degree of Care Required.-The duty of
care owed to a passenger by a common carrier includes the
usc of the utmo:;t care and diligence for his safe carriage.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Carriers, § 42.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Carriers, § 86; [2, 5] Carriers, § 140;
[3J Negligence, § 198(2); [4, 6] Carriers, § 147; [7] Negligence,
§ 32; [8] Negligence, § 180; [9] Trial, § 139(3); [10] Automobiles, § 5; [11] AutOlllobiles, § 333.
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[2] !d.-Passengers-Questions for Court and Jury.-Where a bus
passenger was injured when his elbow, which rested on and
protruded 2 to 4 inches beyond the window sill, was struck
by a parked truck, and where he testified that the rear door
of the truck, which when opened extended 4 inches beyond
the fender, was opened just before his elbow was struck, it
was for the jury to decide whether the bus driver should have
anticipated that this might happen, and whether it was an
independent intervening cause such as would break the chain
of causation.
[3] NGgligence- Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may be relied on to support a judgment though plaintiff offers no jury instruction on the subject and none is given.
[4] Carri.ers-Passengers-Evidenca-Contributory Negligence and
Assumption of Risk.-In a passenger's action against a bus com·
pany for injuries sustaim"d when his elbow, which rested on
and protruded from the bus window, struck the open rear door
of a parked truck, the jury was not required to find that the
passenger was contributorily negligent or that he assumed the
risk where he testified that he had no awareness of impending
danger before the accident happened and that he did not think
his arm could be hit, and where he was not watching the
traffic.
[5] Id.- Passengers- Questions for Court and Jury.-A passenger's resting of his arm on the sill of an open window of a
motorbus does not constitute contributory negligence as a
matter of law; it is a question for the jury.
[6] Id.-Passengers-Evidance-Assumption of Risk.-In a passenger's action against a bus company for injuries sustained
when his elbow, which protruded from an open bus window,
was struck by the open rear door of a parked truck, the jury
was justified in concluding that the passenger did not have
actual knowledge and appreciation of the danger involved so
as to consent to the risk where the facts did not show that he
knew of and appreciated the hazard, where he was not required
to anticipate that the bus company and the truck owner would
be negligent, and where he could not have assumed the risk
unless he actually saw that the door of the truck was open
some time before it struck his elbow and also knew that the
bus was being driven too close to it.
[7] Negligence-Assumption of Risk.-While a person, if fully
informed, may assume a risk though the dangerous condition is

[5] Extension of hand, arm or other portion of body from motor
vehicle as contributory negligence, note, 40 A.L.R.2d 233.
[7] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 79; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 171
et seq.
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caused by the negligence of others, he does not assume the
risk of any negligence which he has no reason to anticipate, but
once he is fully informed of it, the risks arising from such
negligence may be assumed.
[8] Id.-Instructions-Assmnption of Risk.-An offered instruction on assumption of risk is erroneous which advises the
jury that plaintiff would assume the risk if in the exercise of
ordinary care he would have known and apptBciated the
danger rather than that he must have knowledge of the
danger, and the trial court is under no duty to correct such
instruction.
[9]-Trial-Instruetions-Requests-Disposition.-Where the jury
was instructed that it could consider conflicts between a
party's deposition and his testimony at the trial in testing his
credibility, it was not error to omit the additional direction
that "if any statement in a party's dPposition constituted an
admission against interest, it may be considered in determining
the truth or falsity thereof as well as in judging his credibility," since the instruction as given adequately covered the
subject.
[10] Automobiles-Regulation-Doors.-Veh. Code, § 596.6, refers
to the opening of a door of a "motor vehicle," and that term
includes trucks (Veh. Code, § 32), and the reference to loading
and unloading passengers does not limit its application to
passenger vehicles.
[11] !d.-Instructions-Vehicles Standing or Parked in Streets.In a bus passenger's action against a truck ownpr for in
sustained when his elbow, while resting on and protruding
from the bus window, struck the open end of <leteJHlml, ,
parked truck, an instruction on Veh. Code, § 596.6, is proper
where the instruction and code section merely prescribe the
conduct of a man of ordinary prudence with respect to opening doors on the traffic side of vehicles, the question of negligence of the truck owner and its driver being for the jury.

APPEAI,S from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Wallace L. Ware, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries resulting from
an accident. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Melvin L. R. Harris, David S. Smith, Parker, Stanbury,
Reese & McGee and William C. Wetherbee for Appellants.
F. Murray Keslar for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Defendants, Los Ani!eles Transit Lines,
hereafter called Transit Lines, a common carrier of passen-
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gers by bus in Los Angeles, Peb, the driver of one of its
buseR, Langendorf United Bakeries, hereafter called Langendorf, a corporation operating trucks delivering its products,
and Harmell, the driver of one of its trucks, appeal from
a judgment entered on a jury verdict for damages for plaintiff for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by
plaintiff as thr result of defendants' negligence. Plaintiff's
right arm was injured when he was resting it on the window
ledge of Transit Lines' bus in which he was riding as a passenger when it collided with the rear door of Langendorf's truck.
Plaintiff was riding as a regular passenger on a Transit
Lines' bus driven by Peb. He was seated on the right rear
side of the bus beside a window. The day was warm and
that window and others were open. The window ledge waR
shoulder high to plaintiff, and he was resting his right arm
on it with his elbow protruding beyond the outside of the
ledge. The bus was being driven on Beverly Boulevard, a
street having three lanes on each side of its center including
the one next to the curb. Langendorf's truck was parked
on Beverly Boulevard in the curb lane about halfway between two streets intersecting Beverly. The bus swung to
the curb lane and made a stop. The driver proceeded ahead
swinging the bus out toward the center lane (of the three
lanes) and around the truck. He drove so close to the truck
that plaintiff's elbow collided with the door on the end of
the truck which was open and in that position extended
beyond the side of the truck. As a result thereof plaintiff
suffered the injuries for which he was awarded damages
against all four defendants.
Defendants Transit Lines and Feb contend that as a matter
of law they were not negligent; that plaintiff was contributively negligent and had assumed the risk; and that there
was error with respect to the jury instructions.
[1] It is conceded by those defendants: "[T]he duty of
care owed to a passenger by a common carrier includes the
use of the utmost care and diligence for his safe carriage.''
(il1cBride v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 44 Cal.2d 113,
116 [279 P.2d 966].) [2] In the light of that rule the
jury could properly conclude, as it did, that the bus was
driven too close to the parked truck for safety. The bus
was 105 inches wide; the middle lane in which it was proceeding was 108 inches wide. While no part of the bus
contacted any part of the truck, the proximity of the bus
45 C.2d-14
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to the truck was evident.

Plaintiff's elbow was struck and
'rhe
rear door of the truck when open extended 4 inches beyond
the fender, the widest part of the truck, Plaintiff testified
that the door on the truck was opened just before his elbow
was struck, and it was for the jury to decide that the bus
driver should have anticipated that might happen; that it
was not an independent intervening cause such as would
break the chain of causation. (See Richardson v. Ham, 44
Cal.2d 772 [285 P.2d 269] ; Austin v. Riverside Portland
Cement Co .. 44 Cal.2d 225 [282 P.2d 69].) There were no
guards or bars on the bus window. It is common practice
for a person to rest his arm on the window sill of the vehicle
which he is driving or in which he is riding and allow his
elbow to protrude to some extent beyond the window sill.
[3] While it would appear that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is clearly appliea blc as betwePn plaintiff and Peb
and Transit Lines, plaintiff did not invoke the doctrine either
in the trial court or on this appeal. [t may be relied upon,
however, to support a judgment even though plaintiff offers
no jury instruction on the subject and none is given. (Jensen
v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325 [282 P.2d 7] ; Rose v. Melody Lane,
39 Cal.2d 481 [247 P.2d 335].)
[ 4] It is clear that the jury was not required to find
plaintiff was contributively negligent or that he had assumed
the risk. In addition to the evidence above mentioned plaintiff testified that he had no awareness of impending danger
before the accident happened and that he did not think his
arm could be hit; he was not watching the traffic.
[5] Resting the arm on the window sill such as was done
.here does not constitute contributory negligence as a matter
of law; it is a question for the jury. (Sec Albania v. Kovacevich. 44 Cal.App.2d 925 [113 P.2d 251]; Ivancich v. Davies,
186 Cal. 520 [199 P. 7841 : Gornstein v. Priver. 64 Cal.App.
249 [221 P. 396]; 40 A.L.R.2d 233; 157 A.L.R. 1212; 5
hH.A.N.S. 274; Ann.Cas. 1916C, p. 1218.) While there are
a few authorities to the contrary, the great weight of authority
is as stated. (See authorities cited snpra.)
[6] As to assumption of the risk the jury was justified
in concluding that plaintiff did not have actual knowledge
and appreciation of the danger involved so as to eonsent to
the risk and the faets do not show that he knew of and
appreeiated the hazard. (See Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery
Co., 42 Cal.2d 158 [265 P.2d 904].) lie IYas not required

it protruded only 2 to 4 inches beyond the window sill.
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to anticipate that Transit Lines and Langendorf would be
negligent. Plaintiff could not have assumed the risk at all
unless he actually saw that the door of the Langendorf
truck was open some time before it struck his elbow and
also knew that the bus was being driven too close to it.
[7] While a person, if fully informed, may assume the
risk even though the dangerous condition is caused by
the negligence of others (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co.,
supra, 42 Cal.2d 158, 162), "The plaintiff does not assume
~he risk of any negligence which he has no reason to anticipate, but once he is fully informed of it, it is well settled
that the risks arising from such negligence may be assumed."
(Prosser on Torts, p. 385.)
[8] Transit Lines and Feb claim error in the refusal to
give their offered instruction on assumption of risk. Suffice
it to say the offered instruction was erroneous in that it
advised the jury that plaintiff would assume the risk if in
the exercise of ordinary care he would have known and
appreciated the danger rather than that he must have knowledge of the danger (see Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement
Co., snpra, 44 Cal.2d 225; Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co.,
snpra, 42 Cal.2d 158). Under the last cited authorities the
trial court was under no duty to correct the instructions.
[9] Transit Lines and Feb also claim error in the omission from an instruction of the following statement: "If,
prior to the trial, the deposition of a party to the action
was taken, and if part or all of it was read into evidence,
and if you should believe that in said deposition he made
contradictory statement or statements in conflict with his
testimony here in court, you may consider such conflicts, and
any explanations given therefor, in testing his credibility,
in like manner as if all such testimony were given originally
at the trial. The deposition, too, was given under oath.
Also, if any statement in a party's deposition constituted
an admission against interest, it may be considered in determining the truth or falsity thereof as well as in Judging his
credibility." The parts italicized were omitted and it is
asserted that the portion with respect to admissions should
have been left in. The instruction as given adequately covers
the subject.
Defendants Langendorf and Harmell contend prejudicial
error was committe(! in the giving of the following instruction
at plaintiff's request: "You are instructed that Section 596.6
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of the Vehicle Code of the State of California provides as
follows:
"Section 596.6-0pening and Closing Vehicle Doors.
" 'No person shall open the door of a motor vehicle on the
side available to moving traffic unless and until it is reasonably safe to do so, nor shall any person leave a door open
upon the side of a vehicle available to moving traffic for a
period longer than necessary to load or unload passengers.' "
(the word "passengers" was omitted although it appears in
the code section mentioned) : that conduct in violation of
section 596.6 is negligence per se and requires a presumption
of negligence but it is rebuttable and "may be overcome by
other evidence showin;~ that under all the circumstances surrounding the event, the conduct in question was excusable,
justifiable and such as might reasonably have been expected
from a person of ordinary prudence. In this connection, you
may assume that a person of ordinary prudence will reasonably endeavor to obey the law and will do so unless causes,
not of his own intended making, induce him, without moral
fault, to do otherwise.'' Defendants assert the section has
no application to the rear doors of panel trucks; and that
inasmuch as Harmell, the operator of the truck, testified that
he had both doors open to unload merchandise and while
the left door extended beyond the body of his truck it did
not protrude beyond the white line of the curb lane in which
he was parked, the jury ·would no doubt have found him
free from negligence if properly instructed.
[10] Section 596.6 refers to the opening of a door of a
"motor vehicle" and that term as defined in the Vehicle
Code includes trucks. (Veh. Code, § 32.) The reference to
loading and unloading passengers does not limit its application to passenger vehicles. There is no provision bearing
upon a door left open to unload merchandise and in that
respect the instruction was more favorable to defendants
than required by the section. [11] The instruction and
section do nothing more than prescribe the conduct of a man
of ordinary prudence with respect to opening doors on the
traffic side of vehicles. (West v. Hot<se, 99 Cal.App.2d 643
[222 P.2d 269].) We hold, therefore, that the instruction
was proper; the question of defendants' negligence was for
the jury. (West v. House. supra, 99 Cal.App.2d 643.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J ., Shenk, J ., Traynor, J ., Schauer, J ., and
Spence, J ., concurred.

